/AI6h ago

Cambridge researcher Herbie Bradley argues AI is comparable to the Industrial Revolution rather than the internet as models lack capability ceilings

The analysis counter-argued a claim made by Benedict Evans

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Herbie Bradley@herbiebradley#1022inAI

@kanjun @benedictevans agreed, I think "as big as the industrial revolution" is a better comparison

“AI is only as big a deal as the internet or mobile” doesn't seem like a claim that will age well.

What @benedictevans perhaps doesn't account for is that model capabilities have no ceiling. Friends at Anthropic believe Claude will outperform them by 2029, and there’s no fundamental reason why models won't keep getting better, except for limits on compute and data. [1]

It’s comforting to think this will be just another technology wave, but I think something much more radical is in store for our society, and it’s honestly kind of irresponsible to convince people it’ll be business as usual.

I don't think this means we should panic. But it means we should take seriously the problem statements that are coming, e.g.:

1) Market incentives drive AI labs to grow at all costs, so "thoughtful deployment" is wishful thinking. We need to attack the underlying growth incentive structure.

2) It's not clear how economically useful humans will be in the future. Given this, people in the labor class will have a lot less leverage relative to capital. Capital will beget more capital, so it will concentrate. We need to think seriously about where an individual's leverage will come from, economic or otherwise, else we'll lose our freedom and autonomy.

We should consider that we all live in a society, not just an economy.

3) Our legal environment is currently unable to regulate internet technologies well, let alone AI. This is partly because our laws are predicated on outdated ideas of how the world works. Amazon, Google, Meta have somehow managed to escape serious antitrust cases. @linamkhan was one of the first to question some of these assumptions, in Amazon's Antitrust Paradox. We need more serious rethinking on how to handle vertical integration, bundling, interoperability/portability, information collection, distribution advantages, and the variety of other issues that have led to software companies extracting from users the past 10 years.

This is obviously not a comprehensive list of problem statements, but I'd be more excited to see this kind of thinking/work around AI, rather than "this is just like prior waves of automation; there will be displacement and people will need to upskill".

-- [1] When there are data limits, there will be huge market demand for more such data — we already see this with expert data providers like @SnorkelAI. And the world is building compute as fast as it can, with chips more optimized for LLM training/inference, like MatX.

1:32 PM · Jun 3, 2026 · 123 Views
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“AI is only as big a deal as the internet or mobile” doesn't seem like a claim that will age well.

What @benedictevans perhaps doesn't account for is that model capabilities have no ceiling. Friends at Anthropic believe Claude will outperform them by 2029, and there’s no fundamental reason why models won't keep getting better, except for limits on compute and data. [1]

It’s comforting to think this will be just another technology wave, but I think something much more radical is in store for our society, and it’s honestly kind of irresponsible to convince people it’ll be business as usual.

I don't think this means we should panic. But it means we should take seriously the problem statements that are coming, e.g.:

1) Market incentives drive AI labs to grow at all costs, so "thoughtful deployment" is wishful thinking. We need to attack the underlying growth incentive structure.

2) It's not clear how economically useful humans will be in the future. Given this, people in the labor class will have a lot less leverage relative to capital. Capital will beget more capital, so it will concentrate. We need to think seriously about where an individual's leverage will come from, economic or otherwise, else we'll lose our freedom and autonomy.

We should consider that we all live in a society, not just an economy.

3) Our legal environment is currently unable to regulate internet technologies well, let alone AI. This is partly because our laws are predicated on outdated ideas of how the world works. Amazon, Google, Meta have somehow managed to escape serious antitrust cases. @linamkhan was one of the first to question some of these assumptions, in Amazon's Antitrust Paradox. We need more serious rethinking on how to handle vertical integration, bundling, interoperability/portability, information collection, distribution advantages, and the variety of other issues that have led to software companies extracting from users the past 10 years.

This is obviously not a comprehensive list of problem statements, but I'd be more excited to see this kind of thinking/work around AI, rather than "this is just like prior waves of automation; there will be displacement and people will need to upskill".

-- [1] When there are data limits, there will be huge market demand for more such data — we already see this with expert data providers like @SnorkelAI. And the world is building compute as fast as it can, with chips more optimized for LLM training/inference, like MatX.

My biggest takeaways from @benedictevans:

1. We’re in 1997 for AI—it’s as big a deal as the internet or mobile, and only as big a deal as the internet or mobile. We’re at the stage where most stuff kind of doesn’t work yet, most of what people will build hasn’t been built, and it’s not clear how any of it will work when it does. Some people in tech have bought clusters of Mac Minis, while even among 13-to-18-year-olds, only about 15% to 20% are daily active users of AI. The companies that win may not exist yet, and the use cases that matter most are probably invisible to us today.

2. Every technology wave brings ways to ruin people’s lives, deliberately or by accident, and we need to be conscious of that without panicking. Every wave of technology—databases in the 1970s, social media in the 2010s, AI today—creates new ways to harm people. We need to be conscious of these risks, build safeguards, and hold people accountable. But we also can’t let fear of potential harms stop us from capturing the benefits. The goal is thoughtful deployment, not paralysis.

3. Things will probably be okay—but “on average” hides a lot of individual pain. We’ve been automating jobs and creating new jobs since 1800. Each time, you can see the jobs that will disappear but not the new jobs, because they don’t exist yet. We go through frictional pain, dislocation, people lose jobs, towns get hollowed out, and it all sucks. But we come through richer, and we’re not worried about crops failing anymore.

4. If you’re worried about your job, the worst thing you can do is stick your head in the sand and declare AI evil. Yes, some professions face major questions, particularly if you’re an associate or would have been thinking about becoming one. The pyramid structure of professional services may fundamentally change. What helps is submerging yourself in AI, understanding what you can do with it, how it changes things, and how you can be a great hire in this new environment. That may still not be enough, but it’s the only path forward.

5. The history of accounting shows us how automation often increases employment rather than decreasing it. Despite adding machines, punch cards, mainframes, databases, ERP systems, cloud software, spreadsheets, and PCs, the number of accountants keeps going up. This is the Jevons paradox: when you make something cheaper or easier, you don’t do the same amount of work for less money. You often do vastly more because the ROI changes.

6. Distribution is becoming a more valuable moat as software gets easier to build, which favors incumbents. As AI makes building software cheaper and faster, the market gets noisier. More products launch, more companies compete for attention, and breaking through becomes harder. This means distribution—the ability to reach customers and get them to use your product—matters more than ever.

7. Foundation AI model companies won’t have lasting pricing power, and value will likely accrue up the stack. The models don’t seem to have network effects, so there’s no winner-takes-all dynamic. If you have indefinite competition between three to six foundation model providers, and the models look like undifferentiated commodities to users, why would anyone have pricing power? The current pricing chaos—people spending $1.5 million on inference in a month—is temporary disequilibrium, like someone getting a $50,000 mobile data bill in 2010. The steady state will look different.

8. OpenAI and Anthropic are buying consultancies and PE firms. This seems counterintuitive—aren’t these the companies that should need consultants least? But the reality is that companies don’t have people sitting around waiting to reimagine all their internal workflows and figure out which could be automated with AI. That’s a project requiring five to 10 people spending months working it out, then actually implementing it across vertical and horizontal systems.

9. The fundamental question isn’t whether AI automates your job—it’s whether your profession is a "task" or a job. Some jobs are just tasks, and when you automate the task, the job disappears (i.e. elevator attendants). But in most professions, the task you think you’re being paid for isn’t actually what you’re being paid for. McKinsey doesn’t get hired to produce a 75-slide deck—they get hired to walk through your enterprise, understand the politics, talk to customers, and figure out what you actually need to do. The deck is just the artifact.

10. The anti-AI backlash is real, and a fuzzy mass of different concerns, some real and some not—much like the social media backlash. There are tangible concerns: electricity bills went up in some places, though this applies to very few locations objectively. The water consumption issue is largely false; data centers use about 0.017% of U.S. water consumption. There are real questions about jobs, though economists can’t yet find clear consensus in the data about AI’s employment impact. There’s also the culture war over AI-generated content and “AI slop.” The challenge is that all of this creates political pressure even when the underlying facts are unclear or contested.

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