itpolicy.princeton.edu — Princeton security researchers Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman showed that they could easily install software on the machine that would allow an attacker to steal votes from one candidate and give them to another -- they showed that this would be undetectable, and easily done.
Sep 13, 2006 View in Crawl 4
Closed AccountSep 14, 2006
Personally I prefer the lever style voting booths.
Closed AccountSep 14, 2006
For the visually impaired & illiterate
jayfishSep 14, 2006
Hey Omatsei, are you for real? You are correct that the USA not a direct democracy. The USA is what is known as a Democratic Republic. Which means that rather than voting directly on issues, as you would do for something like a referendum, you vote for Congressional Representatives who create our laws on the legislative side of the government. Each state is given the same amount of Representatives in the Senate and a number of Reps, based on population, in the House. The Congress is checked and balanced by the Judicial and Executive branches. This system helps insure against tyranny by majority, which is what we would have under a direct democracy. Don't you think it's kinda funny that we are out to spread democracy in the Middle East if we aren't one ourselves?Jay
protogenxlSep 14, 2006
What happens when 2 groups tamper with the machines?Say firstly a policital group tampers with the machine to give their candidate the advantage, then a group of mischief minded hackers then loads their own software that would give the election to the write-in candidate Noob McTroll.Who Wins?If the second virus overwrites the first one this could lead to a whole new version of capture the flag.
elhafSep 14, 2006
Smurfs are leftist propaganda. Papa Smurf bears more than a passing resemblance to Karl Marx, they were created in a socialist country, everyone works a specific job based on their ability, every one shares equally according to need, and the one evil guy wants to turn Smurfs into gold (a metaphor for corporate exploitation of workers).
tubaboy26Sep 14, 2006
I knew voting machines were bad now there is concrete proof!!!
moovitzSep 14, 2006
Why did they have to make it MUCH more complicated than putting an X in a square..
buellerdiggsSep 15, 2006
youtube version<a class="user" href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sQDMmFmP4ow">http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sQDMmFmP4ow</a>
jadonSep 15, 2006
MY Response to Diebold's Response to Princeton's Examination of Diebold Voting MachinesSubtitle: Doubletalk, Bosh, and Mumbo Jumboby Kathy DoppDiebold says:"The unit [that Princeton studied] has security software that was two generations old, and to our knowledge, is not used anywhere in the country."Yet:In March, 2005 the same severe Diebold security problems were discovered in Emery County, Utah by BlackBoxVoting and Bruce Funk that had been originally discovered in the late 1990's and in early 2003 by RABA Technologies in MD and by others previously. (See <a class="user" href="http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVtsxstudy.pdf)">http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVtsxstudy.pdf)</a> Diebold advertised dozens of non-existant office locations in the white pages in dozens of states, and originally delivered a mixture of used, rejected voting machines to Utah for the price of new ones. (See <a class="user" href="http://UtahCountVotes.org)">http://UtahCountVotes.org)</a>Why should we believe Diebold now? Diebold could prove its claims are true by allowing independent thorough examination of its voting system. (Not by The Election Center - an Association of Election Officials and Voting Machine Vendors favored by Maryland's Election Director, Linda Lamone because it includes the same election insiders who pushed through unauditable paperless, fundamentally flawed, hackable voting systems despite public and expert opposition). The Princeton team noted that Diebold's hardware also needs to be fixed.Diebold says:"Normal security procedures were ignored. Numbered security tape, 18 enclosure screws and numbered security tags were destroyed or missing so that the researchers could get inside the unit." Yet:Diebold voting machines do not use available common-sense security measures and did not even remove the development tools from its operating system, making its system less secure than an electronic toy. Insiders are always the biggest threat to any voting system. Insiders include all Diebold staff and election officials and workers. The Princeton team demonstrated that election stealing software can be inserted without ignoring any security procedures, by simply accessing a memory card prior to an election. Princeton even showed that a savvy voter could possibly buy cards and vote multiple times. To anyone observing an election, election rigging would look exactly like a normal election. (See the Princeton film <a class="user" href="http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/)">http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/)</a> Diebold says: "A virus was introduced to a machine that is never attached to a network."Yet:The Princeton team did not network the machines and the virus can be transferred from one machine to another on a memory card, such as whenever the software is updated or when an election supervisor installs the election definition files, or if someone like a poll worker has one minute's access to the machine. Diebold says:"The current generation AccuVote-TS software - software that is used today on AccuVote-TS units in the United States - has the most advanced security features, including Advanced Encryption Standard 128 bit data encryption, Digitally Signed memory card data, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) data encryption for transmitted results, dynamic passwords, and more." Yet:Edward Felten, director of the Center for Information Technology Policy and professor of computer science at Princeton, claimed that the new safeguards still don't ensure security. "Just because they use a digital signature, just because they use encryption, that's a check-box approach that doesn't pass muster in any security analysis," he said. Felten also noted that encryption doesn't prevent an attack of the kind used in the study because the encryption key is present in the machine. "The malicious software has the full run of the computer. It has access to everything."Diebold says: "In addition to this extensive security, the report all but ignores physical security and election procedures. Every local jurisdiction secures its voting machines - every voting machine, not just electronic machines. Electronic machines are secured with security tape and numbered security seals that would reveal any sign of tampering." Yet:Malicious software can be most easily installed during the normal course of storing, maintaining, updating, or conducting elections without raising any suspicion. It is virtually impossible to secure these machines using the security procedures in use today in election jurisdictions. BlackBoxVoting, Princeton, and Avi Rubin, among others, have shown that Diebold's "security tape" is easy to tamper with, without leaving any noticeable evidence. New security tape is also available for purchase. Third, The security tape can be avoided altogether by removing a few screws. (See Avi Rubin's "day as a poll worker" <a class="user" href="http://avi-rubin.blogspot.com/2006/09/my-day-at-polls-maryland-primary-06.html)">http://avi-rubin.blogspot.com/2006/09/my-day-at-polls-maryland-primary-06.html)</a>Diebold says:"Secure voting equipment, proper procedures and adequate testing assure an accurate voting process that has been confirmed through numerous, stringent accuracy tests and third party security analysis." Yet:Only persons uneducated in computer science would buy that logic. Diebold deliberately avoided having its modified operating system software federally tested. No amount of testing would assure a tamper-free election, as Princeton explained in its movie clip and is further explained in this testimony before the US Congress by DAVID WAGNER, PH.D. COMPUTER SCIENCE DIVISION UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2006 in Question #1 of Responses to "Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman Ehlers and Chairman Boehlert..."<a class="user" href="http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/qfr-house06.pdf">http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/qfr-house06.pdf</a>Diebold says:"Every voter in every local jurisdiction that uses the AccuVote-TS should feel secure knowing that their vote will count on Election Day." Yet:To secure the accuracy of election results we must audit - manually count - voter verifiable paper ballot records associated with sufficient vote counts to give a 99% probability of detecting any outcome-altering vote miscount. Banks, businesses, and churches are subjected to independent audits. Election outcomes determine who controls budgets in the millions to trillions of dollars, yet are not sufficiently audited in any state.-------------------------Kathy Dopp<a class="user" href="http://electionarchive.org">http://electionarchive.org</a>The National Election Data ArchiveDedicated to accurately counting elections.The National Election Data Archive will soon be publicly releasing a new mathematical method of calculating vote count audit amounts that will ensure election outcomes are accurate.
jadonSep 15, 2006
Site specifies FLV wrong in the HTML, so the video doesn't play. Summary is to vote absentee to avoid using the machines.
quashSep 19, 2006
India uses far more secure voting systems that are tamper proof and far more affordable. Of course, many Americans couldn't stand the idea of importing a voting technology from India, assuming they could do a better job.Let's try using modified Indian EVMs to vote. Perhaps then we'll be able to identify the true winner.<a class="user" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_voting_machines">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_voting_machines</a>
petdanceSep 28, 2006
Many would say that we ARE currently under an elected official who was not legally elected.
petdanceSep 28, 2006
Imagine you're in a bar and guy bets you 10:1 you can't guess if a number he's thinking is even or odd. So you take the bet. "Even!" you say. "Sorry, I was thinking of 7", he says, and takes your dollar. And you just have to take his word for it.That's what voting maches are. There is no ballot. No proof. No way to recount. We have to accept that what the machine says at the end of the election is how people voted. There is no recourse. No audit trail. Nothing.Voting machines remove the power of the ballot from the electorate.