There is no paradox, the problem is the English language.Just like the Greek Liar Paradox <a class="user" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liar_paradox,">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liar_paradox,</a> it's not a real paradox, it's a matter of semantics. In mathematical logic, this sentence is not a problem.The paradox arises only in languages that are "semantically closed" by which he meant a language in which it is possible for one sentence to predicate truth (or falsehood) of another sentence in the same language (or even of itself). To avoid self-contradiction, it is necessary when discussing truth values to envision levels of languages, each of which can predicate truth (or falsehood) only of languages at a lower level. So, when one sentence refers to the truth-value of another, it is semantically higher. The sentence referred to is part of the "object language," while the referring sentence is considered to be a part of a "meta-language" with respect to the object language. It is legitimate for sentences in "languages" higher on the semantic hierarchy to refer to sentences lower in the "language" hierarchy, but not the other way around. This prevents a system from becoming self-referential. (This is the Tarski version).
lying by definition implies that Pinnochio was aware of the falsehood of his statement when speaking it. If he is unaware or he believes it to be true then, by definition, he is not lying. lying entails willingly and knowingly deceiving. here are the truth cases:Believes true = nose does not growBeleives false = nose growsDoesn't know = nose does not grow. Respectfully.
monsieurbucketMar 2, 2009
Theres a nice simple way to say it! Finally. . .
mtheoryxMar 2, 2009
I love Heroes.
lovehandles74Mar 2, 2009
shrinkage
sageerrantMar 3, 2009
Unless the timing of this shot is such that he is becoming one right now, it doesn't apply very well to the paradox.
thyphateMar 6, 2009
There is no paradox, the problem is the English language.Just like the Greek Liar Paradox <a class="user" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liar_paradox,">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liar_paradox,</a> it's not a real paradox, it's a matter of semantics. In mathematical logic, this sentence is not a problem.The paradox arises only in languages that are "semantically closed" by which he meant a language in which it is possible for one sentence to predicate truth (or falsehood) of another sentence in the same language (or even of itself). To avoid self-contradiction, it is necessary when discussing truth values to envision levels of languages, each of which can predicate truth (or falsehood) only of languages at a lower level. So, when one sentence refers to the truth-value of another, it is semantically higher. The sentence referred to is part of the "object language," while the referring sentence is considered to be a part of a "meta-language" with respect to the object language. It is legitimate for sentences in "languages" higher on the semantic hierarchy to refer to sentences lower in the "language" hierarchy, but not the other way around. This prevents a system from becoming self-referential. (This is the Tarski version).
goodperson557Mar 7, 2009
lying by definition implies that Pinnochio was aware of the falsehood of his statement when speaking it. If he is unaware or he believes it to be true then, by definition, he is not lying. lying entails willingly and knowingly deceiving. here are the truth cases:Believes true = nose does not growBeleives false = nose growsDoesn't know = nose does not grow. Respectfully.
tuerlemondeMar 14, 2009
Strange Loops indeed
suzymarineMar 17, 2009
Can you pls explain that ?
adamwhoJun 7, 2009
Get over it